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     Abstract—This research examines the effect of 
commissioner and remuneration committee 
characteristics on the remuneration in the 
banking sector of Indonesia. Using a sample of 18 
banks for the fiscal year that ends on December 31 
2006 through 2012, this study finds evidence of 
negative impact of gender and number of meeting 
on the remuneration. With respect of size as a 
control variable, this study proves a positive 
impact on the remuneration.      
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According to a survey of Indonesia Bank, 
Indonesia has the highest incentive fee among the 
directors of banks in ASEAN. Incentive fee of 
banking directors in Philippines is 1.1 million Rupiah 
per year, 5.6 million Rupiah in Malaysia, 2 million 
Rupiah in Thailand, and 12 million Rupiah in 
Indonesia [32]. Salaries of directors and 
commissioners of banks in Indonesia is the highest in 
Southeast Asia [32]. According to the state minister 
of economic, remuneration system should be based 
on performance [17]. 
Executive remuneration is important because 
proper remuneration could motivate human resources 
to work better and board director to take actions or 
policies that meet the interests of shareholders [18], 
key to attract and retain the best executive, as an 
incentive for managers to boost productivity of 
manager and show better financial performance [18]. 
Remuneration committee was set up in 
Indonesia banking in 2006 with the regulation of [29] 
and modified in [30]. Remuneration committee tasks 
are to generate remuneration policies and make 
recommendations to the board of commissioners and 
is expected to assist the commissioners in aligning 
the interests of managers and shareholders [19]. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the 
effect of the characteristics of the commissioners and 
remuneration committee to the remuneration of 
banking in Indonesia. Characteristics of the 
commissioners in this study are: gender proportion, 
size of commissioners, proportion of independent 
members, the number of commissioners meeting, and 
frequency of attendance at the commissioner 
meeting. Characteristics of the remuneration 
committee are: the proportion of independent 
members and size of remuneration committees with 
control variables are firm size and firm performance. 
The difference of this study with previous 
studies is this study does not use a stock ownership as 
monitoring instrument to company. Unlike previous 
research in Indonesia such as [27], this research 
correlated to remuneration committee. 
In the next section, we will explain about 
literature review and hypotheses development in 
section two, research method in section three, result 
and discussion in section four, and research 
conclusion and implications in section five. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Agency theory explained that the agency 
conflict occurred because of the separation between 
ownership and control of the company [18]. In these 
circumstances, managers had a tendency to make the 
consumption of excessive additional advantage. To 
minimize conflict between insider and external 
stakeholders, monitoring mechanism is needed to 
align them [9]. 
Compensation package as internal mechanism 
was developed to align the interests of managers with 
shareholders [18], [19], such as ESOP (Employee 
Stock Ownership Plan) or a stock option. With the 
ownership of shares, when any increase in the 
company's performance would have a direct impact 
on the welfare obtained [37]. 
According to references [11], [8], [28], [39] and 
[20] corporate governance influenced remuneration. 
Reference [1] examined the influence of gender on 
governance and performance of the 1939 companies 
in the US in the period of 1996-2003. They reported 
that greater gender diversity would encourage over 
monitoring because women were more active than 
men in the meeting attendance. When monitoring is 
increased, it became more rigorous in monitoring so 
that the total remuneration become lower. Women on 
the board effects executive compensation negatively 
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because women are more careful than men. Thus, the 
hypotheses can be stated as follows: 
H1: Proportion of gender on the boards negatively 
affects remuneration  
According to reference [7] the greater size of 
commissioners, the easier and more effective in 
monitoring activities of management. This opinion 
was supported by [12] which stated that the greater 
size, the more complete in expertise is commissioner.  
The board member required coordination and 
communication with each other in order to achieve 
the best performance. According to [23] greater size 
of commissioners affect remuneration positively 
especially on basic salary and bonuses. This happen 
because of the existence of potential inefficiency, 
rent-seeking, and free rider issues in the company. 
Reference [10] stated that CEO compensation 
correlated positively with the size of BOD.  
Reference [28] stated that when size of the board was 
getting bigger, it would provide greater 
compensation. Thus, the hypotheses could be stated 
as follows: 
H2: Size of commissioners positively affects 
remuneration 
Reference [2] stated that the monitoring 
activities of the board could be viewed via the 
number of meeting. The same opinion was expressed 
by [11] which stated that the number of 
commissioners meeting was one way to create an 
effective board of directors. Thus, the hypothesis can 
be stated as follows: 
H3: The number of commissioners meeting 
positively affects remuneration 
Reference [11] stated that the greater number of 
the commissioners who came to the meeting will 
increase the communication between the directors 
and the company's internal controls, so that the work 
of commissioners became more effective. Members 
of the board commissioners who attend the meeting 
show that they were serious in carrying out their 
duties [36]. 
Reference [1] stated that frequency of 
attendance at meetings was one way to get important 
information and performed their monitoring task. 
Higher level of attendance in meeting means better 
process of board governance and evaluation, 
therefore the hypotheses proposed in this study was: 
H4: The frequency of the board meeting 
attendance positively affects remuneration 
According to [14], commissioners from outside 
can increase the effectiveness of the board in carrying 
out its primary function which is to oversee the 
management of the company. This primary function 
affect remuneration decisions of the company. The 
objective decision will increase the congruence 
between the interests of the agent and the owner. 
This opinion was supported by [5] and [34] 
which stated that the greater number of independent 
members of board commissioner the better 
management and monitoring mechanism. Thus, the 
hypotheses can be stated as follows: 
H5: The proportion of independent members of 
the board of commissioners positively affects 
remuneration 
Reference [9] find a positive effect of the 
proportion of outsider remuneration committee 
members on the level of remuneration. The results 
were supported by [33] who find that the greater 
proportion of independent members of remuneration 
committees would increase the level of remuneration 
at 416 companies in the Canadian Public Companies 
during the period of 2000-2005. The results were 
confirmed by [15] who examined the influence of the 
independent members of the compensation 
committee to the CEO compensation in US for the 
period of 2004-2005. Reference [15] find that the 
independent members of compensation committee 
increase CEO compensation. Thus, the hypotheses 
can be stated as follows: 
H6: The proportion of independent members of 
the remuneration committee positively affects 
remuneration 
Reference [34] examined the effects of the 
compensation committee on CEO compensation at 
812 companies in the US for the period of 2001. 
Reference [34] reports that growing size of the 
compensation committee was associated with higher 
pay-performance. The greater size of remuneration 
committee was expected to produce more qualified 
recommendation on the board. The same result was 
found by [34] at 474 companies in the US during the 
period of 2001-2004. Thus, the hypotheses can be 
stated as follows: 
H7: Size of the remuneration committee positively 
affects remuneration 
 
III. RESEARCH METHOD 
A. Population, Sample and Sampling Techniques 
The population are all banks listed in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in the period of 2006-
2012, totaling 28 companies. The samples are 18 
banking consists of 4 state-owned banks and 14 
private banks with purposive sampling method.  
 
B. Operational Definition and Measurement of 
Variables 
Total remuneration includes: a) remuneration 
in the form of non-kind, including salaries and other 
fixed income, among other benefits, stock-based 
compensation, bonuses and other forms of 
remuneration, and b) other facilities in the form of 
natura/non- natura i.e., no other fixed income, 
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including allowances for housing, transportation, 
health insurance and other facilities, which cannot be 
owned or possessed [30] and [35]. The formula to 
calculate total remuneration of commissioners is 
 
Total remuneration of Commissioners (TR) = Non 
Natura Remuneration + Other Facilities in Kind/Non 
Natura                                                       (1)                                                           
 
This study uses the company's total assets as a 
measure of firm size [24], [38], [2] and [21] and firm 
performance which is measured by ROA as control 
variable [6], [13], [31], [38].  
 
C. Hypotheses Testing 
This study uses multiple regression analysis to 
determine the effect of independent variables on the 
dependent variable. The regression equation use in 
this study is as follows, 
 
TR = a0 + b1GEND + b2SBC +b3NMBC + 
b4FABC + b5IBC + b6 IRC + b7SRC + b8SIZE + 
b9 PERF + e                  (2) 
Where: 
TR :  Total Remuneration of BoC 
GEND :  Proportion of Gender in BoC 
SBC :  Size of BoC 
NMBC :  Number of Meeting BoC 
FABC   : Proportion Frequency of Attendance BoC     
Meeting 
IBC           :  Proportion of Independent member BoC 
IRC     : Proportion of Independent Member RC 
SRC     : Size of RC 
SIZE     : Total Asset 
PERF     : ROA 
BoC      : Board of Commissioner 
RC     : Remuneration Committee 
 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The classic assumptions of the regression model 
are tested before regression statistics analysis is done. 
The assessment shows that the data are normally 
distributed and there is no problem with classic 
assumptions. The statistic descriptive is presented in 
Table 1. Based on Table 1, the sample can explain 
that the remuneration varies from 1.606 million to 
336.37 million with a mean value of 53.2 million. 
According to a survey of Indonesia Bank, Indonesia 
has the highest incentive fee among the directors of 
banks in ASEAN countries. 
Regression result is presented in table 2. Based 
on table 2, proportion of gender variable affects 
remuneration. This result shows negative (-1.162) 
and significant coefficient (p = 0.000). This result 
support H1 and consistent with prior studies done by 
[1] which found that greater proportion of gender in 
Board of Commissioner encourage smaller 
remuneration. 
Size of commissioner does not affect 
remuneration. This result shows insignificant 
coefficient (p = 0.318). This result does not support 
H2 and does not consistent with [25], [28], and [23] 
which stated that greater size of commissioners will 
encourage higher compensation based equity. 
Number of meeting in Board of Commissioner 
affects remuneration. The result shows negative (-
0.010) and significant coefficient (p = 0.000). This 
result does not support H3 and consistent with [21] 
which found that the more frequent meeting was 
done, the more detail agenda to be discussed. 
Reference [21] stated that mechanism through 
Corporate Governance meeting negatively affected 
the amount of remuneration. 
 















Variables Min Max Mean Std Dev 
Total Remuneration board of commissioner (million)   1.606 336.370  53.200  61.207 
Proportion of gender in board of commissioner (%)   0.00   67.00     8.78  14.967 
Size of board commissioner   2   10     5.528    1.769 
Number of meeting board of commissioner   3 123    22.61   21.964 
Proportion frequency of attendance in BoC meeting (%) 27.83 100.00    85.266   14.343 
Proportion of independent member of board commissioner (%) 30.00 100.00    56.16   12.03 
Proportion of independent member of RC (%) 20.00 100.00    44.90   14.867 
Size of remuneration committee    2     9      4.21     1.638 
Total asset (billion)    2.052 635.618 103.389 137.256 
ROA (%)  -0.016     0.09      0.018     0.0134 
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  Table 2 Hypotheses Testing Used Enter Method 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
C   8.863  7.659 0.000 
Proportion of Gender in BoC  -1.162 -4.544 0.000***) 
Size of BoC   0.040   1.002 0.318 
Number of Meeting in BoC  -0.010 -3.597 0.000***) 
Proportion Frequency of Attandance in BoC meeting   0.080  0.640 0.523 
Proportion of Independence member in BoC  -0.309 -0.668 0.505 
Proportion of Independence Member in RC  -0.458 -1.339 0.183 
Size of Remuneration Committee   0.025   0.664 0.508 
Firm Size (Total Asset)                                  0.638 11.656 0.000***) 
Firm performance (ROA)    1.082   0.236 0.814 
Adjusted R-squared  
 
    0.784   
   F-statistic   51.547***)                           
   DW stat                     1.664   
***)  : significance at  α = 1 % 
**) : significance at α = 5 % 
*) : significance at  α = 10 % 
 
Frequency in attendance of meeting does not 
affect remuneration. This result shows the coefficient 
(p = 0.523) and does not support H4. Frequency of 
attendance of meetings was one way to get important 
information and performed their duties in monitoring 
[1]. Higher level of attendance in meeting means 
better process of board governance and evaluation 
Proportion of independent members on the 
board variable does not affect remuneration. This 
result does not support H5. This result is indicated by 
coefficient (p = 0.505) and confirm the research 
which was done by [3], [4], [8]. 
Proportion of independent members in 
remuneration committee variable does not affect 
remuneration, so does not support H6. This result is 
indicated by coefficient (p = 0.183). This condition 
might happen because remuneration committee only 
make recommendations and does not make decision 
about how much the remuneration based on the 
regulation in Indonesia banking. The result supported 
by [9], [22], [26], and [38]. 
Size of remuneration committee variable does 
not affect remuneration. The result shows positive 
(0.025) and insignificance coefficient (p = 0.508). 
The result does not support H7 and does not 
consistent with the study of [34] which stated that the 
bigger size the remuneration committee bigger 
remuneration. It might be caused of inefficient due to 
decisions making. 
Firm size positively affects remuneration as was 
indicated by coefficient (0.638) and probability of 
significance was 0.000. This means that the larger the 
size the higher the remuneration. This result was 
supported by previous research which were done by 
[24], [38] and [39]. Because larger companies had 
complex tasks to be carried out, greater responsibility 
and effort were required to run the company, so 
remuneration was getting bigger [36]. 
Firm performance does not affect remuneration 
as is indicated by coefficient 1.082 and probability 
significance is 0.814. This result does not confirm 
research was done by [16] and [23].  
 
 
V. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
Based on the descriptive data, remuneration 
was highest in Southeast Asia, so the implication was 
that Bank of Indonesia reviewed the rules on 
remuneration in Indonesia banking, so remuneration 
gap became smaller. According to these results, two 
proxies of CG influence remuneration. The 
implication was that BI should revise the rules on the 
number of meetings and evaluate gender proportion 
in board of commissioner. 
Reference [30] stated that there were no 
regulations governing the gender proportions in the 
BoC, so still a bit of banking in Indonesia which 
provided the opportunity for women to have positions 
in the BoC. Besides that reference [30] has been set 
on the number of BoC meetings in general, but there 
are no clear rules regarding the minimum number of 
meetings to determine remuneration. Therefore, Bank 
of Indonesia may review the regulations pertaining to 
the gender proportions in the BoC and BoC meeting 
number especially in determining remuneration. 
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